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The “Perforated City:” Leipzig’s Model of 
Urban Shrinkage Management
By Daniel Florentin
Abstract
Leipzig, Germany has been continuously shrinking since 1966, a 
phenomenon accelerated and transformed by the post-socialist 
transition since 1989. The term “perforated city” was created 
to describe a new era of cities characterized by simultaneous 
demographic decline and urban sprawl. Unlike other East German 
city authorities, such as Dresden’s, Leipzig’s decided to adapt to 
shrinkage and perforation at an early stage in an attempt to manage 
the shrinkage process and take advantage of change. City planners 
aimed to build the image of a dynamic, sustainable city serving as 
a model of urban shrinkage management. Three main axes can be 
identified in their planning strategy: preserving the architectural 
heritage, considered a trademark of the city, creating green spaces and 
open spaces to replace dilapidated housing estates, and supporting 
the creation of a micro-scale hierarchy of centres. In practice, these 
strategies were largely limited to a marketing campaign based 
on the traditional rhetoric of urban regeneration, as planners 
lacked the financial and legal tools to fully implement them. Some 
interventions lead to conflicts with land owners about land use 
and might further intensify social and spatial differentiations in a 
context of territorial competition and polarisation. This case study 
is based on empirical research, including interviews with actors 
involved in shrinkage management, and an analysis of statistical 
data. It concludes that Leipzig’s image-based strategy could be, like 
Maya’s veil, a decoy aimed at hiding lack of influence and financial 
power to achieve the aim of managed shrinkage.
Keywords: Leipzig; shrinkage, urban regeneration, image management; 
conflicts
Introduction: Leipzig’s Double Exception
The city that Goethe once envisaged as the new Paris to be is today no 
longer the glorious centre that the German writer imagined. But it is still 
an exceptional city, or rather, a city of exceptions. In this paper I shall 
describe Leipzig as a city characterized by two-fold exceptions, both 
temporal and political.
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Like most East German cities,1 Leipzig did not start to shrink with the 
end of the socialist regime. In fact, urban shrinkage is an old situation in 
Leipzig rather than a new crisis, though it has taken on critical dimensions 
since 1989 and the “shock therapy” (Bontje 2004) that followed the end of 
the socialist regime in the former German Democratic Republic (GDR). In 
almost all East German cities, the transformations generated by the post-
socialist transition accelerated both economic and demographic declines 
that were already underway (Kommission Lehmann-Grube, 2000; 
ACT Consultants ; Bauhaus Universität Weimar 2007; Lötscher 2005). 
Employment scarcity provoked major outmigrations, as well as social 
and spatial restructuring. Approximately 1.7 million inhabitants left the 
former GDR between 1991 and 1999 (Glock & Häussermann 2004).
This process affected the city of Leipzig to a rather critical extent. The 
population has been constantly declining since 1966 (Nuissl & Rink 2004), 
making Leipzig an exception to other shrinking German cities, where the 
phenomenon is more recent. This fairly old demographic decline could 
account for the second exception that characterizes the city. While in other 
East German cities, such as Dresden, the authorities have long ignored 
and denied decline (Wiechmann, 2007), Leipzig’s officials decided to deal 
with urban shrinkage at an early stage, to accept it as a fact and convert it 
into a chance and an opportunity, rather than to bemoan it as a disaster. 
Leipzig’s originality was that it embraced its future as a shrinking city, 
and adopted strategies in order to make the most of it (Bontje 2004). 
This should have led to what is commonly called a “paradigm shift”, 
from an ideal of growth to the recognition of actual shrinkage (Leibniz 
Gemeinschaft 2007). As one member of the city planning department had 
it, a planned shrinkage should not be viewed as a horror scenario but as 
the promise of a fulfilling and attractive future, (Lütke Daldrup 2000) .
Slogans such as “Neue Gründerzeit”2 or “Mehr Grün, weniger Dichte”3 
were the motto and the motor of this policy of managed shrinkage, which 
consisted of turning shrinkage processes into opportunity and promoting 
Leipzig as a dynamic, sustainable city. A marketing strategy was 
implemented which aimed at revitalising the image of a city that had lost 
its centrality during the socialist period and the post-socialist transition. 
This work on image is no new method, but one may question whether it 
is suited to become the mainstay of urban shrinkage management. 
Upon closer examination of the discourse underlying the marketing 
campaign, the traditional rhetoric of urban regeneration is found. 
Similarly, the strategies that aim to make Leipzig a dynamic and 
1.  Especially those situated in the southern part of the former GDR (Dufaux, 1996)
2.  “New Foundation Era” and also referred to the architectural era at the turn of 
the 19th  to the 20th century
3.  “Greener and less dense”
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sustainable city require closer examination, especially as the word 
“sustainable” has frequently been misused in public discourse over 
the last few years. My purpose is to understand how this rhetoric has 
influenced the evolution of the city, especially in terms of social and 
spatial polarisations. My thesis is that this image-based strategy serves as 
a “veil of Maya,”4 hiding the financial powerlessness and inefficiency of 
the planning system in Leipzig.
To draw a balanced picture of the city’s development and assess the validity 
of my thesis, I combined three different kinds of analyses: a review of the 
academic and grey literature on the topic, analysis of statistical data, and 
interviews with actors directly involved in the shrinkage management 
process, such as members of the city planning staff, academics and 
researchers, politicians, housing firms representatives, and association 
chair persons and inhabitants. 
I. Leipzig, A Perforated City: The Urban History of a 
Long-term Decline
Leipzig and Shrinkage: A Long Urban History
To present Leipzig as a shrinking city is to deal with an old phenomenon, 
which has only recently become a popular topic: as a matter of fact, 
Leipzig’s population has been slightly decreasing since 1933. At that time, 
it was over 700 000 inhabitants, whereas it hardly exceeded the symbolic 
barrier of 500 000 inhabitants in the 2000s. After the demographic decline 
of the 1960s and 1970s, yet another population decline set in when the 
GDR regime collapsed. Yet it was not related to the same causes. Indeed, 
two main phases are to be distinguished within Leipzig’s continuous 
decline. The first one, under the socialist regime, was of lesser magnitude 
and resulted mostly from three phenomena: migration to the attractive 
region of Berlin, low fertility rates5 and GDR planning policies that 
deliberately restricted Leipzig’s growth. The planning measures aimed 
to equally develop the national territory by curbing growth in the 
populated, industrial South and supporting it in some of the more 
sparsely populated Northern regions. This redistributive growth policy 
was instrumental in creating a “belt of demographic weakness” in which 
Leipzig was located (Dufaux 1996).
4.  In Hinduism, Maya is known as the goddess creating illusion. The German 
philosopher Schopenhauer revisited the theme of the veil of Maya, which is to 
be understood as a veil of illusion hiding some elements of the reality (see The 
World as Will and Representation).
5.  like in all GDR main cities
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From Shrinkage to Perforation
But the phenomenon took on a completely new dimension after 1989. 
During a tremendous wave of depopulation linked to a huge economic 
crisis, the city population dropped by 12% within a mere 10 years. Rather 
than a difference in degree, this was a real change in nature.
Yet this urban evolution cannot be separated from a broader context of 
urban shrinkage which affected a large number of German cities (Herfert 
2002; Hannemann 2003; Kil, 2003; BBR 2007). Leipzig, though deeply 
touched by this phenomenon, was not a solely shrinking city in a growing 
environment (Kunze 2002; Kunze and Lenk, 2007). Häussermann and 
Siebel were among the first, in the late 1980s, to point out shrinkage 
processes in some Western German cities of the deindustrialising Ruhr-
region (Häussermann and Siebel, 1988).
But the main phenomenon occured with a tremendous wave of urban 
decline in the Eastern part of Germany following the fall of the Berlin 
Wall and the complex post-socialist transition processes. This was largely 
and long denied by both authorities and academics6, as if this should 
only be a transitional state which was to be overcome in a few years 
(interviews with R. Löhnert, director of the main housing cooperative 
in Leipzig, and S. Gabi, city of Leipzig staff). Only a dramatic crisis of 
housing estate companies elicited a public debate and transformed the 
perception of urban shrinkage at a national scale: with a million vacant 
houses (Kommission Lehmann-Grube 2000; Glock & Häussermann 
2004), the Eastern part of Germany experienced a new and long-lasting 
urban trend, combining a threefold demographic, economic and urban 
transformation.
In this general context of deindustrialisation, which is to be understood 
both as a tertiarisation of production and as a destruction of the 
traditional means of production that were never replaced by modern 
services (Hannemann 2003), Leipzig thus lost about 100 000 inhabitants 
between 1989 and 1999. Within less than four years, between 1989 and 
1993, the number of industrial jobs in the city plummeted by 90%, as 
about 90 000 out of 100 000 merely disappeared. These huge employment 
and population losses created a new spatial organization and new social 
landscapes.
Three more or less succesive processes might account for this decrease 
in population (interview with M. Bernt, researcher). Indeed, the second 
phase of shrinking originated from an important wave of migration to 
6.  For a comprehensive review of literature on urban shrinkage and debates 
on shrinking cities in Germany, see Brandstetter, Lang, & Pfeifer, 2005 and 
Florentin, Fol, & Roth, 2009
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the Western part of Germany just after the Reunification (about 25 000 
people by 1992), from massive suburbanisation (50 000 people, mostly 
between 1993 and 1998), and from a decline in the birth-rate combined 
with a fairly high death-rate (– 2500 people per year, so 25 000 within that 
decade) (Lütke Daldrup, 2000, Nuissl & Rink, 2004).
In the 1990s and the early 2000s, the two-fold out-migration of people and 
of industries from Leipzig due to de-industrializaiton and suburbanization 
was not compensated for by any substantial in-migration, so that it 
triggered spatial consequences and created a kind of “perforation” (Nuissl 
& Rink, 2004). The urban landscape thus became “perforated” by physical 
“holes” and patches of waste land. Rather than a normal consequence 
of urban sprawl, this was a new kind of urban development which has 
emerged in contrast to the traditional ideal of compact European cities, 
even though the latter is still presented as an objective in all Leipzig 
official publications. Local discourses all promote the ideal of Leipzig as a 
traditional European compact city even though it does not exist anymore, 
or, more precisely, it is belied by the current evolution.
Perforation as a Fact: How to Deal with Shrinkage
The processes of shrinkage briefly presented above are neither unknown 
to, nor denied by the local authorities. In 2000, when the whole debate 
on shrinking cities (schrumpfende Städte) really started, especially thanks 
to the report of the commission on structural changes in the housing 
markets of the new Länder (Kommission Lehmann-Grube, 2000), 
Leipzig’s authorities had already decided to cope with the problem and 
therefore, to integrate it into their planning system and policy. The head 
manager of the planning staff, Engelbert Lütke Daldrup, even coined 
the phrase “perforated city” to describe nothing but a fact, the reality of 
perforation, a new urban pattern which was then spreading out to the 
Eastern part of the city (Lütke Daldrup, 2003). In the face of the planner’s 
nightmare that a perforated city then spelt, Leipzig’s planners responded 
by seeking new strategies and alternative ways to deal with it, taking up 
the challenge of urban shrinkage to make the city a model of shrinkage 
management
This does not altogether mean that the “growth obsession” evoked by 
Bontje (2004) disappeared from the planning system. The persistence of 
growth-oriented planning can be seen in the following two cases. First, 
in 1999, around ten suburban cities were incorporated into Leipzig, a 
decision that was made on the state level (land), but completely accepted 
by the city authorities. The annexation (Eingemeindung) was also used 
as a statistical subterfuge to artificially gain 50,000 inhabitants. In just 
one operation, the cities of Leipzig, Dresden and, on a smaller scale, 
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Chemnitz, which had been experiencing a severe population decline 
over the previous years (see illustration 1), suddenly gained over 50,000, 
25,000 and 10,000 “new” inhabitants, respectively (see illustration 2). This 
could be seen as a marketing strategy to preserve the image of growth, 
but it might be also a financial device. Many federal funds are actually 
allocated to cities according to the size of their population, which makes 
it crucial for them to pass the 500,000 inhabitants mark (interviews with 
B. Glock and M. Bernt, 2008; Knabe, 2002). The incorporation was thus a 
means not only to transform the former suburban areas into urban ones, 
but also to secure access to these significant federal funds.
The second illustration of a persistent pursuit of urban growth strategies 
by Leipzig planners is their projection that the city’s population will 
grow continuously until 2015 or 2020 (Stadtplanungsamt Leipzigs 2006, 
and interview with K. Pannike, Leipzig’s planner 2008). A number of 
experts from the state of Saxony and from various academic institutes 
share neither their optimism nor their determination to reverse the 
demographic trend.
Nevertheless, Leipzig’s planners tried to promote a rather unique 
integrative method of shrinkage management with three main goals: 
preserving the urban quality of the city centre, reducing urban density 
through the creation of green or free spaces, and improving the 
Illustration 1: The evolution of the population in Saxony (1995-1998) 
Source: Daniel Florentin with data of the Land of Saxony
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competitiveness of the city and its centres. This strategy for managed 
shrinkage was summarized from 2000 in Leipzig’s Integrative Urban 
Concept, the STEP (Stadtentwicklungsplan) or INSEK (integratives 
Stadtentwicklungskonzept), their main planning document. This 
integrative planning program did not exist elsewhere in Saxony, and so 
raised curiosity and interest among city planners in other cities such as 
Dresden. It expressed a vision of the city’s evolution and a detailed a 
series of actions to be implemented which took the reality of decline into 
account.
II. Programs and Visions: Three Examples of Image 
Policy in Leipzig
Leipzig’s plan for managing shrinkage in a perforated city was 
composed of three main axes or objectives: the preservation of the 
architectural heritage, the extension of green and open spaces, and 
the creation of a hierarchy of centres. All three axes of the STEP plan 
should be considered crucial to achieve a sustainable and dynamic 
city development pattern. However, there were unmistakable signs 
Illustration 2: the effects of incorporation (1998-1999) 
Source: Daniel Florentin with data of the Land of Saxony
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of the city authorities’ image-based strategy, which covers a discourse 
pervaded by the typical rhetoric of urban regeneration.
Preservation of Architectural Heritage
One of the pillars of the planning projects consists or consisted in 
renovating and rehabilitating the main part of the old city centre. The 
architectural patrimony of the so-called “Gründerzeit” (Foundation 
Era) was supposed to be the image of the town, the city’s “trademark” 
(Lütke Daldrup, 2000). This patrimony, which the socialist regime used 
to despise, was in need of a huge rehabilitation plan. It is now praised 
by planners as a way to improve the quality of the whole city. This new 
orientation was given through a program whose motto called for a “Neue 
Gründerzeit”, an ambivalent name that is pregnant with meaning. It 
refers to a specific period in the history of German architecture (1870-
1918) and symbolically calls for a New Foundation Era. Thus Leipzig’s 
modernity is to be found in its glorious past, in its refurbished older 
neighbourhoods. Large and prestigious projects such as the expensive 
rehabilitation of the main railway station or the construction of a new 
fair7 (Kunze, 2002) were to be the emblems of the new era. 
These prestige projects were accompanied by a large-scale marketing 
campaign endorsing Leipzig as a “Messenmetropole”, (Fair Metropolis). 
All over the city, elements of street furniture echo this slogan (see 
illustration 3). The local authorities were thus trying to use the traditional 
rhetoric of city rebirth and regeneration that had been experimented 
on other European cities, such as London (Colomb, 2006). By contrast, 
the other main architectural heritage, that of the GDR is not laid aside, 
but often politically discussed in terms of areas to be demolished, as in 
the Grünau neighbourhood, for instance. A two-fold contrasted image 
of Leipzig thus emerged, with a famous touristic city centre on the one 
hand and home to vast, devaluated housing estates (Plattenbauten) 
on the other. Although they used to epitomize modern comfort at the 
time of their construction, these dense socialist housing complexes are 
now regarded almost as a plague one has to get rid of. By contrast, the 
historical city centre represents a vision of Germany’s traditional past, 
which is considered more deserving of preservation.
However, whatever the stated goals, this patrimonial policy of selective 
historic preservation was mainly implemented via marketing tools. This 
preservation strategy clearly relies on advertising, with an emphasis on 
creating striking images achieved with little financial means. Leipzig is 
described and promoted as Bach’s and Mendelssohn’s city and some 
7.  Die neue Messe, which is still unprofitable
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“cultural itineraries” through the historical centre foreground the tourist-
friendly aspects of an otherwise active city. Secondly, the strategy is 
mostly oriented toward structures and might lack a social element. 
Symptomatically, regarding the city centre renovation project, the 
first public duty or objective evoked in the planning documents is the 
necessity to develop consulting on the local housing market and local 
marketing (Stadt Leipzig - Dezernat Planung und Bau, 2000). Given the 
scope of the renovation program8 and the small financial means of the 
city, the historic preservation strategy must be envisaged as an incentive 
program rather than a public works agenda. As a marketing strategy it 
also highlights one of the fundamental transformations of Leipzig, from 
a central industrial city into a tertiary one, mostly oriented towards 
services, especially tourism. 
“Mehr Grün, Weniger Dichte” (More Green Spaces, Less Density)
The second main axis of Leipzig’s program for urban shrinkage 
management is the logical consequence of the perforation diagnosis: in the 
holes generated by the perforation process, green and open areas should 
be created in order to improve the quality of life in affected districts or 
8.  2,500 housing estates of the “Gründerzeit”-era are still to be rehabilitated in the 
city centre
Illustration 3: Leipzig as the “Messenmetropole”. A part of the street furniture, 
a symbol of identity. 
Source: Daniel Florentin
Berkeley Planning Journal, Volume 23, 201092
neighbourhoods. However, under the federal program financing urban 
redevelopment, Stadtumbau Ost (Urban Restructuring in East Germany), 
new constructions on demolished sites are generally disallowed for the 
following ten years, so that a “natural” land use is about the only solution 
left for landowners (Rößler 2006). It could thus become the catalyst for a 
wider public parks and open spaces policy. But, as the areas whose change 
is hoped for and encouraged are not public spaces, the city’s adopted 
motto of “greener through fewer houses” is really dependent on the good 
will of private house-owners. A realistic, “green” urban planning policy 
cannot be envisaged without their commitment. This is problematic 
because landowners in demolished areas are looking for opportunities to 
construct new, valuable buildings later on when conditions change, and 
they often consider a “green” use to be transitory. Even the artistic projects 
created thanks to E.U. funds of Urban II (see illustration 4) are thought of 
as temporary, although they are supposed to reinforce the attractiveness 
of disadvantaged areas such as Lindenau. 
A comprehensive “greenification” strategy for Leipzig might quickly 
become a myth, or at least, remain a difficult horizon to reach. The official 
aim is to make the city more environment-friendly and to create a green 
network (Kunz 2007), but an integrated “green” urban vision seems to be 
lacking, especially in places where much land still remains to be allocated 
to some use, such as Grünau (Rößler 2006). The explanation for this is 
simple: the land owners’ logic is not and could not be the same as that 
of city planners, for economic criteria will remain a priority to housing 
firms. 
Furthermore, the maintenance of open spaces is sometimes a burden 
that landowners cannot or do not want to afford. They might not then 
maintain these “green” spaces, all the more likely as large housing 
estate companies are often in a very critical financial situation. Instead 
of a garden with fruit-trees or leisure-oriented activities, landowners, 
be they firms or private individuals, will often opt for the construction 
of low-maintenance parking areas, even if this does not contribute to 
“greenifying” the district (Bernt, Rößler, & Kabisch 2005). Landowners 
may consider the creation of parking areas as an upgrade. For instance, 
parking areas have been spreading around one of Leipzig’s main 
streets, Strasse des 18. Oktober, on properties owned by the public 
housing firm Leipziger Wohnungs- und Baugesellschaft (LWB), in 
spite of real opportunity to build a large park or other infrastructures. 
“Upgrading open spaces implies either to make green spaces or to 
build parking areas. We usually build parking areas” (interview with 
LWB staff, 2008). 
Under these conditions, the city’s “green” policy is more of an inciting 
image policy than an effective ecological strategy. This fact can hardly be 
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concealed by merely using rhetoric and metaphors: speaking of ‘plasma’ 
and ‘core’ instead of city centre, as Leipzig’s planners do (Kunz, 2007), is 
bound to remain useless in this respect.
Prioritizing Centres
The last axis we want to examine is the policy of prioritizing a hierarchy 
of centres, which Leipzig’s city planners have been implementing on a 
micro-scale. The reality of perforation requires a complete redefinition 
of the system of centrality (Stadt Leipzig - Dezernat Planung und Bau, 
2000). Not only was the concept of a city centre to be “shaken”, but 
the project of managed shrinkage also implied creating the image of a 
dynamic city. Faced with economic and population decline, Leipzig’s 
authorities chose to concentrate activities, especially retail trade, in some 
selected ‘centres’. The 2000 STEP created a new network of local centres, 
ranked A, B or C, according to their importance. The general idea was to 
focus services to create mini-hubs, or at least mini centres of activity, such 
as Paunsdorf Center (ranked B) in the Eastern part of the city, or Mockau 
Center (ranked C) in the North-East.
However, this project of re-prioritizing centres to create mini-hubs is 
based on one determining factor, competitiveness. The more competitive 
the centre, the bigger it becomes. In a context of urban decline, this could 
only magnify the polarisation process that was already at work. The 
Illustration 4: Stattpark, an art project sponsored by Urban II. 
Source: Daniel Florentin
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competition between territories, even on such a micro-scale, could lead 
to an aggravation of social and spatial differentiations, and go so far as to 
create “declining” and “reviving” zones. City planners tend to adapt to 
economic change rather than to re-orient it; one tends to reinforce what 
is already strong and to leave aside the weak parts the city cannot afford 
anymore. In Leipzig planners openly acknowledged that city officials 
must make some choices, and stop investing in hopeless (aussichtslos) 
districts so as to adapt to the changing economic situation (Lütke Daldrup 
2000). The choice is openly acknowledged: one tends to reinforce what 
is already strong and to leave aside the weak parts the city cannot afford 
anymore. The strategy relies upon some obvious economic logic, but it 
could also potentially create the conditions for social disaster, or at least 
for sharper social and spatial discrepancies or inequities.
III. Problems and Inefficiencies: Leipzig’s Strategies 
Behind the Veil of Maya
The study of these three axes shows how important an image-based 
strategy is to remain for Leipzig, but this must be understood within 
a context of actual inefficiencies. The crude reality is that Leipzig’s 
strategies for embracing and managing urban decline are partly aimed 
to conceal the inability of city planners to implement them. Compared 
to cities of a similar size9, Leipzig’s model experiences many frailties. 
“Leipzig’s reputation is better than Chemnitz one, which traditionally 
received bad press, though economic and social indicators even show 
that Chemnitz has a better situation than Leipzig” (interview with S. 
Weidner, researcher, 2008). 
Bare Financial Facts: An Overwhelming Debt
Like almost all East German cities, Leipzig is deeply in debt and has to 
cope with a very serious financial crisis—such problems are even worse 
in Leipzig than they tend to be in most other German cities (see table 
1). The city’s indebtedness, which had been around €75 million in 1992, 
increased up to €860 million by 2000, and the situation was so serious 
that regional authorities were forced to create a special system in order to 
stop generating new debts. To deal with the problem, they implemented 
the “Haushaltssicherungskonzept” (Budget Security Plan), according to 
which public finances should return to an affordable debt-rate within the 
next five or six years.
This has direct repercussions on investments in urban planning projects, 
all the more so as the city is highly dependent on federal or regional 
9. For  an overview of Dresden’s case, see Wiechmann, 2007. 
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subsidies. Many programs like “Stadtumbau Ost” (Urban Restructuring 
East) or “Soziale Stadt” (Social City) are thus based on a co-financing 
system: each partner (federal, state, city) is required to give a third10 of the 
needed funds. If the city cannot fulfill its financial obligations, the whole 
subvention disappears. Every Euro from the city should then generate 
two more Euros in public grants; but the federal contribution to Leipzig 
decreased from €148.4 million in 2002 to only €64.9 million in 2005, 
mainly due to co-financing impossibilities (ACT Consultants ; Bauhaus 
Universität Weimar 2007).
This financial crisis drastically diminished the range of available urban 
strategies, and could reveal Leipzig’s massive image campaign rather 
as an ersatz-strategy chosen for want of financial power. Revitalization 
strategies implemented by the city could sometimes be extremely 
creative, such as the “Wächterhäuser” (House with Guardians) 
program, in which cultural associations can “use”  a deteriorated house 
without paying any rent provided they contribute to its rehabilitation. 
Many such creative projects11 have earned Leipzig a reputation as 
a model of urban shrinkage management, yet most of these projects 
somehow reflect a serious lack of financial resources. City authorities 
are confined to offering some associative frame for their projects, since 
they are unable to provide substantial financial help and must actually 
cut public expenses. Such housing projects are promoted as ways to 
lower vacancy rates and regenerate disadvantaged areas, however, to 
date there are only thirteen Wächterhäuser among 45,000 vacant houses. 
They sometimes seem nothing but little drops against the background 
of a tremendous wave.
10 .  In the Stadtumbau Ost program, this only applies to upgrade measures within 
maintained neighbourhoods, not to demolition measures, which are equally 
funded by the federal government and the state, but not by the city.
11.   Not only Wächterhäuser are being implemented, but also “Selbstnutzer” 
(owner-occupier program), or “Freiräume für Bügerträume” (Open Areas for 
Inhabitants’ Dreams), and many other experimental though micro-orientated 
projects.
Leipzig Former West 
Germany
Former East 
Germany
1992 150 - -
1995 957 833 744
2000 1,754 1,226 1,017
2003 1,837 1,207 1,077
Table 1: Indebtedness per inhabitant in constant Euros.  
Source : ACT Consultants data
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Planners Lack Implementation Tools?
In such conditions of financial hardship, urban planning suffers from 
a lack of influence, and it can hardly measure up to the population’s 
expectations, especially concerning the upgrading of green or open spaces, 
in part because planners lack the tools to control and implement plans. 
For instance, studies of the Grünau neighbourhood in Leipzig show that 
building demolitions are often carried out without regard for any district-
wide and comprehensive strategies, for they are the result of individual 
decisions rather than city plans, (Rößler 2006). The procedure for building 
destruction that was created by the national program Stadtumbau Ost12 
has forced landowners to face what is often referred to as the typical 
prisoner’s dilemma, and they have consequently developed various 
responses. All homeowners could potentially benefit from the removal or 
destruction of a surplus house in a neighbourhood, for it would enhance 
the market for the rest of the houses. But no one wants to be the first to 
demolish, especially when one cannot afford to rebuild anything on the 
vacated area, as detailed in the program Stadtumbau Ost (Bernt 2005).
That goes so far as to build up the image of a planning system 
“perforating” itself. In this interpretation, planning only focuses on 
projects that are bound to succeed or have a low level of conflict potential 
(Bernt 2006). We are entering a phase that could be described as the era of 
the “myth of planning” (Bernt 2005) or of “random planning” (Doehler 
2003), which is a contradiction in terms. Under such circumstances, 
Leipzig’s image strategy may be understood as subterfuge that hides the 
real powerlessness and lack of influence of city planners.
An Aggravation of Socio-Spatial Problems?
As a consequence, and in the context of spatial and social polarization, 
one may wonder whether a policy of creating mini-centres that relies on 
competition and competitiveness could lead to further intensification of 
the social and spatial discrepancies within the city. Because of its lack of 
financial means, and perhaps reinforced by the kind of policy it chose, 
Leipzig may have to cope with new, or at least greater social and spatial 
inequities. There is some evidence of this, such as a rising vacancy rate 
in the areas located between its various mini-centres which could lead to 
their cumulative downgrading, which only middle-income households 
could overcome (Glock & Häussermann 2004). 
Lötscher (2005) has already noted that not only inter-city, but also intra-
city disparities have been increasing in East Germany. In the long run, 
12.   This program was supposed to regulate the huge vacancy rate in East German 
Cities through massive destructions and, ideally, through upgrading measures.
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this could create ghetto-like areas, or at least destitute districts. One could 
thus wonder whether the preconditions for this process can all be found 
in Leipzig and, therefore, whether they herald a time of greater inequity. 
So far, one can already observe an aggravation in these socio-economic 
and socio-spatial differences. The number of people on welfare has been 
constantly increasing over the last few years, and the situation of the 
poorest areas of the city has gone from bad to worse, (Schmidt, Wiessner, 
& Arnold 2002; Wiessner 2007). Consequently, the city may be facing a 
new social crisis, characterized by stronger socio-spatial disparities. As 
Lötscher described the process on a regional scale, further comparisons 
and research projects could evaluate whether and how deep these rising 
disparities also apply to other Eastern German cities such as Dresden or 
Chemnitz.
Conclusions
Leipzig’s authorities seem to have taken a realistic approach to urban 
shrinkage, and to have developed plans which take it into account. It 
appears they are embracing creative ways to deal with this new type 
of urban crisis and treating it as an opportunity. The sheer variety of 
projects and programs they are trying to launch reflects a strong desire 
to change old practices and implement new strategies based on managed 
growth rather than inadequate, obsessive growth policies. Successful 
implementation could lead them to take yet another step, allowing for a 
paradigm shift in city planning and management.
However, because city planners and officials lack financial power and 
planning influence, their approach is often confined to image-based 
strategies, which cannot significantly slow down the progression of social 
inequalities on a micro-scale. Leipzig used to be a spatially “neutral” city: 
where one lived was not an indicator of any social category, (interview 
with S. Schlegel and G. Hoffmann 2008). The situation has profoundly 
changed since the end of the GDR regime as perforations and new socio-
spatial divides have appeared.
At the national level, twenty years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, no 
balance has been found between Eastern and Western Germany: crisis 
has endured in the Eastern part of Germany, (Bafoil 2006). This has 
lead to new social and spatial disparities both on national and local 
scale. Bridging such gaps requires measures that a solely image-based 
strategy may not entirely provide. Leipzig’s model turned consequently 
into a twofold one: very innovative and attractive on the one hand, but 
also fragile and easily influenced by contextual changes on the other. 
Leipzig’s strategy of urban shrinkage management mainly relies on 
public initiative, as opposed to other cities such as Dresden, which opted 
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for a private-based strategy by selling the communal housing estates firm 
to a private American firm, the Fortress Investment Group. On a long-
term view, Leipzig’s strategy could be advantageous both to citizens and 
to comprehensive political orientations to handle shrinkage issues. Yet, 
Leipzig’s unstable local finances will remain the main frailty to solve 
to make a comprehensive and efficient shrinkage management policy 
possible.
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